Weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms in banks have been pointed out as the main factor that contributed to the 2007-08 financial crisis. The purpose of this study is to analyze empirically how the global financial crisis of 2007-08 has impacted on banks' governance mechanisms, comparing the differences between the two most important models of corporate governance (the shareholder and stakeholder models), and if these changes are related to improvements in banks' governance effectiveness. To carry out our analysis, we have used a sample with 46 of the largest commercial banks in the world and the period of analysis has covered from 2002 until 2015. Our findings show that Anglo-American banks following the common law system (shareholder model) maintained their high level of governance effectiveness after the financial crises. On the other hand, Continental European banks following the civil law system (stakeholder model) increased their effectiveness after the crisis changing some practices in their corporate governance mechanisms (improvements in the structure and functioning of directors' boards, improvements in the compensation policy for banks' executives, as well as the implementation of CSR committees) what led to a convergence of both governance systems.
The global financial and banking crisis of 2007-08 has revealed the importance of enhancing understanding of bank governance (Gebba, 2015) . Weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector can affect banks' performance and economy as a whole (Zakaria et al., 2018) so that they were pointed out as the main factors that contributed to this crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Marcinkowska, 2012) . Thus, banks' boards were blamed for what appear to be excessive pay packages that their executives received even while their firms were failing or being bailed out by the government (Adams, 2012) . Hence, the implementation of strong governance practices in the sector is essential to have effective bank systems what is critical to achieve and maintain a higher level of public confidence in the banking system (BCBS, 2006; Burlaka, 2006; Gebba, 2015; Levine, 2002; Zakaria et al., 2018) .
While specific features of banks and their influence on the corporate governance have raised the interest of some researchers (Laeven, 2013; Levine, 2004; Macey and O'Hara, 2003) , there are relatively few cross-national studies about the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector (Maxfield et al., 2018) . In this way, Levine (2002) stresses the importance of broad cross-country analyses to carry out a stronger research on financial systems. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to analyze empirically how the global financial crisis of 2007-08 has impacted on banks' governance mechanisms, comparing the differences between the two most important models of corporate governance (the shareholder and stakeholder models), and if these changes are related to improvements in banks' governance effectiveness. To carry out this research, we have employed a dataset with 46 of the largest commercial banks in the world and the period of analysis covers from 2002 until 2015. Specifically, we propose to analyze the following research questions (RQ): RQ1: Has banks' governance effectiveness improved after the financial crisis? RQ2: Are these changes different depending on the banks' governance system?
The present study contributes to the academic literature providing new empirical evidence about corporate governance effectiveness in the banking sector after the global financial crisis of 2007-08.
Corporate governance in the banking sector
Corporate governance (CG) can be defined as 'a system of supervisory mechanisms used by all suppliers of crucial inputs in order to ensure returns on their investments in the corporation without jeopardizing corporation's prosperity' (Becic, 2011 (Becic, , p. 1361 . Traditionally, CG 'provides rules and appropriate control mechanisms through which, on the one hand shareholders can supervise the decisions of managers, and on the other hand partners can be monitored and motivated' (Ungureanu, 2012, p. 625) . However, from a broader perspective, CG may be considered 'as a web of relationships, not only between company and its owners (shareholders), but also between a company and a broad range of other persons with a "stake" in the company ("stakeholders"): employees, customers, suppliers, etc.' (Turlea et al., 2010, p. 382) . Therefore, the CG would include the practices usually adopted by a company in achieving its objectives in relation to its shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers, regular authorities and community at large (Balasubramaniam and Pradhan, 2005) .
Banks have special features that intensify governance problems and might reduce the effectiveness of standard governance mechanisms (Laeven, 2013; Levine, 2004) . Even though the boards of financial firms have the same legal responsibilities as boards of nonfinancial firms, the former may face more pressure to satisfy non-shareholder stakeholders than the latter (Adams, 2012) . Thus, regulators, for example, expect boards to act to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial institution, an objective that may not necessarily be in shareholders' best interest (Adams, 2012) .
Moreover, the banks 'are subject of stricter regulations in comparison with other entities, because they are responsible for protecting the rights of the depositors, ensuring the stability of the payment system and reducing systemic risk' (Turlea et al., 2010, p. 380) . Laeven (2013) and Levine (2004) discuss the interaction between bank governance and bank regulation identifying three main CG mechanisms that might be limited by bank regulation: ownership concentration, market for corporate control, and monitoring by debt holders. In many countries, 'bank regulation restricts the concentration of bank ownership and the ability of outsiders to purchase a substantial percentage of bank stocks', so that 'this limitation aims to prevent nonfinancial firms from exercising a controlling influence over banks that might distort banks' lending decisions or to avoid a high concentration of power in the economy' (Kose et al., 2016, p. 306) .
On the other hand, the activity in the banking industry is characterized by the complexity of the operations, which increases information asymmetry and diminishes the stakeholders' capacity to monitor the decisions of bank managers (Gebba and Aboelmaged, 2016; Kose et al., 2016; Zakaria et al., 2018) . According to Levine (2004) , the opacity of banks has important governance implications. First, the asymmetry of information in the context of banking makes it more difficult for diffuse equity holders to control managers and for debt holders to control banks from risk shifting from shareholders to debt holders (Gebba and Aboelmaged, 2016; Zakaria et al., 2018) . Second, opacity makes it more difficult to design effective incentive contracts. Thus, opaque bank managers can often design compensation packages to benefit them at the expense of the long-term success of the bank (Kose et al., 2016) .
According to Turlea et al. (2010) , these features of the banking sector require the implementation of more specific and complex banking corporate governance mechanisms. Among the recommendations to improve the banks' CG mechanisms, we can name the following (Adams, 2012; Gebba, 2015; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Kose et al., 2016; Maxfield et al., 2018; Turlea et al., 2010) :
• Board of directors. The board of directors is an important entity in a company, creating a link between shareholders and managers and, therefore, playing an important role in the corporate governance of a firm (Ooghe and De Langhe, 2002) . The literature generally argues that smaller boards should be more effective because decision-making costs are lower in smaller groups. In addition, the literature generally argues that the boards that are more independent, that is, with more directors without social or business managerial connections, should be more effective. However, board independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks because independent directors may not have sufficient expertise to monitor complex banking firms and oversee the actions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Adams, 2012; Zakaria et al., 2018) . Finally, block holders use their voting power to influence the way corporations are being governed (Becic, 2011). • Board committees. Committees are supplementary components to the board of directors. They are required to conduct particular activities or tasks that the board delegates in them. Hence, directors need to attend board meetings in order to obtain information on companies. Committees most commonly provided are the audit committee, the nomination committee, and the remuneration committee. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2001) , each bank should have an internal and independent audit charter since an efficient internal audit Global Policy (2020) Financial Crisis and Banks' Governance function is a valuable source of information for the bank's management and for those that oversee it.
• Executive compensation. In the literature, one of the most common principles of corporate governance is that the compensation for executives is an important tool for aligning managerial decisions with the interests of shareholders. A substantial body of research contributed to the prevailing view that managerial incentives deter managerial opportunism and enhance firm value if they are used appropriately. To align managerial incentives with those of shareholders, CEOs and directors should receive a certain amount of performance-based pay in the form of equity.
• Takeovers. The role of the financial market in controlling corporate management is becoming more important with the development of stock markets. The threat of takeovers can constraint managerial actions and limit agency costs. Consequently, the takeover constraint limits the extent to which managers pursue strategies and take actions that fulfill their own interests at the expense of their shareholders.
On the other hand, it has been proved that the legal system can be an important variable when analyzing CG issues (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Baraibar-Diez et al., 2016; Cicon et al., 2010; Stefanescu, 2011; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008) . This may be even more important in the banking sector (Hope, 2003) . There are two prevailing models of corporate governance in market-based economic systems (Becic, 2011; Maxfield et al., 2018; Ooghe and De Langhe, 2002; Ungureanu, 2012 ): the shareholder model, which is typical in Anglo-American countries, and the stakeholder model, which is applied mainly in the Continental European countries. Each system has its own characteristics and ways of functioning, although one system is not considered better than the other one.
The shareholder model (also known as common law system), which is based on the agency theory, considers corporate governance, mainly, as a mechanism used to maximize shareholder value and mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers (Maxfield et al., 2018) . In this model lies the idea of market discipline, which generally means private sector monitoring by investors (Burlaka, 2006) . Large and liquid stock markets, low concentration of ownership, one-tier board of directors, a relatively high level of protection for minority shareholders, and dominant role of the institutional investors are basic characteristics of this system (Becic, 2011; Tipuri c et al., 2009) .
In contrast, the stakeholder model (also known as a civil law system) is based on the stakeholder theory, according to which a balance has to be achieved among the interests of the various stakeholders, so that managers are responsible for a wider group of stakeholders, besides shareholders, such as employees, customers, business partners, and so on. In this model, corporate ownership is concentrated among a small number of investors. Along with banks and employees, it has a significant impact on governing processes (Becic, 2011) . Concentrated ownership structure enables owners to maintain the control over the corporation and to make decisions that enhance the corporate profitability instead of enlarging the corporation's size through large investments. Therefore, in this case the market for corporate control has a lower impact on management than in the shareholder model.
Methodology Sample
To carry out our analysis, we have used a sample with 46 of the largest commercial banks in the world according to their total assets in 2015 (see Table 1 ). The banks included in the sample were chosen depending on two criteria: (1) the bank is from a country with the CG system used in our research; and (2) the availability of corporate governance and financial data from these banks in the Thomson Reuters' ASSET4 database. The period of analysis has covered from 2002 until 2015 (14 years).
Variables
A set of different practices related to CG mechanisms has been obtained from the ASSET4 database (see Table 2 ). This database provides environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information through the Datastream software from Thomson Reuters. The CG mechanisms and practices included in our analysis are the following: board of directors (4 practices), board committees (9 practices), executive compensation (5 practices), and takeovers (3 practices). In addition, we have also included in our analysis a global governance index to analyze the level of corporate governance effectiveness of each bank. The measure employed for this analysis has been the Corporate Governance Score of the former database. This index assesses corporate systems and processes to ensure that board members and executives act in the best interest of shareholders. It reflects the companies' capacity to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of incentives and control systems in order to generate long-term shareholder value. Hence, this index was used as an indicator of CG effectiveness.
Testing methods
We have divided the entire period of analysis into two different sub-periods to analyze the questions of this research: period 1, composed of those years before the global financial crisis (2002-07), and period 2, composed of those years after the crisis . To test the significance of the changes in the CG practices, we have calculated the mean value of each variable (practice) in each sub-period for scalar variables (points, years, numbers, or percentages). In this case, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test was used to test the significance of the differences between the mean values of the two-paired periods. In addition, for dichotomous variables (Yes/No), we have calculated the proportion of banks with one of these variables in each sub-period and then we have run the non-parametric test of McNemar to contrast statistically the difference of proportions between two-paired periods. Financial Crisis and Banks' Governance
Empirical results
The empirical results of this research are structured according to the different CG models and mechanisms. In Table 3 , we present the results obtained with the shareholder model (common law system) and in Table 4 the results obtained with the stakeholder model (civil law system).
Board of directors
The structure and functioning of directors' boards present differences between banks of each governance system. Thus, Anglo-American banks (common law system) averaged almost 14 directors in the period 2002-15, whereas the average number of directors in boards of Continental European banks (civil law system) was over 16 members. This number of directors have been maintained almost constant between the two periods of analysis being the Anglo-American boards, on average, smaller than Continental European banks. With regard to the number of board meetings, boards of Anglo-American banks averaged 12.1 meetings per year in the whole period analyzed , whereas Continental European banks only averaged 10.9 meetings per year. However, the latter banks increased significantly the number of board meetings after the financial crisis, increasing the number of meetings from 9.3 in the period before the crisis (2002-07) to 12.4 meetings in the period after the crisis .
In the case of board independence, whereas only 54 per cent of the chief executive officers (CEOs) of Continental European banks are members of banks' boards, all CEOs of Anglo-American banks are included in their boards. This difference between both CG models is maintained after the financial crisis.
Finally, Anglo-American banks required more shareholder votes for election of directors than European ones. In the first case, on average, 76.7 per cent of the banks required a majority vote to choose the board members against 74.0 per cent in the second case. This variable had a significant increase in banks of both governance systems after the financial crisis, what supposes an improvement in shareholders' rights.
Therefore, Anglo-American banks present a higher degree of corporate governance than Continental European banks when we compare the structure and functioning of the boards of directors, although the latter banks have increased their governance effectiveness improving this mechanism significantly after the financial crisis of -2007-08.
Board committees
In this case, we have not found significant differences in the implementation of board committees between both governance systems, except in the case of CSR or sustainability committees. This finding can be explained by the high percentage of banks that had implemented audit, compensation and nomination committees before the financial crisis, probably motivated by the application of different governance regulations and conduct codes in the majority of large banks. In contrast, CG committees of Continental European banks presented a lower percentage of implementation (48.7 per cent) than Anglo-American banks (100 per cent). Moreover, Anglo-American banks' committees showed higher percentages of independence in all committees than European banks.
Concerning CSR or sustainability committees, the results obtained with this practice are very similar regardless the governance system, although Continental European banks (civil law system) have, on average, a higher implementation (79.1 per cent of the Continental European banks versus 77 per cent of the Anglo-American banks). Thus, the percentage of banks having a CSR committee, or a CSR team, has increased from 57.7 per cent to 96.2 per cent of banks with a common law system and from 63.2 per cent to 95 per cent of banks with a civil law system. The fact of having a specific committee or team for CSR issues has had an impact on the accountability and transparency of banks after the financial crisis.
Consequently, we can conclude that banks of both governance systems present a high implementation of governance procedures of this mechanism before the financial crisis. Only CSR or sustainability committees have been implemented significantly after this crisis, improving banks' accountability and transparency.
Executive compensation
The percentage of banks from countries with a common law system requiring shareholders' approval for a stock-based compensation and their vote for executive pay suffered a significant change after the financial crisis. On average, before the financial crisis 34.6 per cent of the Anglo-American banks required the shareholders' approval of a stock-based compensation plan and 53.8 per cent of them required the shareholders' vote on executive pay, whereas after the financial crisis those percentages were 88.5 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. Likewise, those banks from countries with a civil law system presented similar differences, although Continental European banks showed lower percentages of implementation than Anglo-American banks. In this case, the requirement of shareholders' approval increased from a 36.8 per cent before the financial crisis up to a 60 per cent after the financial crisis, whereas the requirement of shareholders' vote on executive pay increased in Continental European banks from a 10.5 per cent up to a 65 per cent.
Hence, we can conclude that the changes in the compensation policy for banks' executives after the financial crisis have improved the banks' governance effectiveness regardless the governance system, being the governance mechanism with the largest variation in their practices.
Takeovers
Concerning the mechanism of takeovers, our results show that golden parachutes are the most employed practice to Financial Crisis and Banks' Governance avoid takeovers by bank managers regardless the governance system. An average of 80.8 per cent of the Anglo-American banks and a 43.9 per cent of the Continental European banks presented this practice during the period 2002-15. The proportion of Anglo-American banks with a classified board structure decreased significantly after the financial crisis. A classified board is a practice in which only a fraction of the members of the board of directors is elected each time. In this case, before the financial crisis a 23.1 per cent of these banks employed this practice, whereas there were no banks using it after the financial crisis, what has supposed an improvement of the Anglo-American banks' governance system.
On the other hand, the proportion of Continental European banks including a golden parachute increased significantly after the financial crisis. A golden parachute is a large payment, or other financial compensation, guaranteed to a company executive if he/she should be dismissed as a result of a merger or takeover. This difference of behavior can be explained because the majority of Anglo-American banks used golden parachutes before the financial crisis (76.9 per cent of these banks), whereas Continental European banks presented a lower percentage of implementation (only 27.8 per cent). At the same time, Continental European banks also incremented the use of golden shares, which give shareholders veto power over changes in companies, after the financial crisis (35 per cent of these banks). Nevertheless, this increase was not statistically significant.
Therefore, we can conclude that there has been an increase in the use of anti-takeover practices after the financial crisis by managers of Continental European banks in order to reduce the effectiveness of financial markets. In the case of Anglo-American banks, however, managers were already using this practice before the financial crisis.
Banks' governance effectiveness
Regarding governance effectiveness, banks in common law countries averaged a CG Score of 77.2 points for the period 2002-15, whereas banks in countries with a civil law system only averaged 59.9 points. High standards of corporate governance in those countries following a common law system will give the edge in results. However, this score changed after the financial crisis, being positive and significant for banks with the civil law system. It increased from 53 points in the first period up to 66.8 points in the second period of our analysis. By contrary, the change in the score has not been empirically significant for banks from countries following a common law system.
Looking at Figure 1 , we observe a convergence of both governance systems along the period of analysis what agrees with Becic's (2011) comment about the convergence movement of CG systems. This convergence began before the financial crisis of -2007-08 and it is motivated by the improvement in the CG Score of Continental European banks. Despite this significant improvement in CG effectiveness of European banks, we also observe a larger gap between both systems after 2012. This change of trend might be explained by the financial crisis of sovereign debt in Europe that affected strongly to European banks' financial performance and, consequently, their CG effectiveness.
Hence, we can conclude that banks from countries with the stakeholder governance model have experimented, on average, an improvement in their governance effectiveness after the financial crisis of -2007-08, whereas banks with the shareholder model maintained their high level that they had before the financial crisis.
Conclusions
In this last section, we summarize the main findings of our research, answering the questions that we proposed to investigate. This study provides a detailed analysis about changes in the implementation of governance practices between large banks following the shareholder and stakeholder models after the -2007-08 financial crisis and how these changes have helped to enhance the governance effectiveness in the banking sector.
A weakness of this research is that our sample is limited only to international large banks. Thus, future research may extend the sample to explore CG differences between large and small banks or between banks with other governance systems (e.g. Nordic and Islamic banks). Moreover, the inclusion of country-level governance mechanisms would improve the analysis since our research is limited only to firm-level governance mechanisms. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze the relationship between the implementation of specific committees (e.g. the governance committee) or the application of different forms of executive compensation and banks' financial and social performance.
Regarding RQ1, we have observed governance improvements in the functioning of directors' boards (number of meetings or election of directors), in the implementation of CSR or sustainability committees, and in the approval of shareholders to compensate banks' executives. There is a clear change in the relationship between banks and CSR, Financial Crisis and Banks' Governance since the percentage of banks with a special CSR committee or team has increased significantly in both governance systems after the financial crisis. In addition, we have also observed changes in the anti-takeover practices although of different signs. Whereas Anglo-American banks have improved this governance mechanism eliminating classified board structures, more Continental European banks have implemented golden parachutes after the financial crisis what goes against the shareholders' interest. Moreover, banks following the Anglo-American system of corporate governance have maintained their high level of governance effectiveness after the financial crises. On the other hand, Continental European banks following the civil law system increased their effectiveness after the financial crisis, improving some practices in their corporate governance mechanisms as we have already explained in the previous section. This finding responds to the high standards of corporate governance in common law countries before the -2007-08 financial crisis, which other systems try to achieve.
With regard to RQ2, all corporate governance mechanisms have changed after the financial crisis regardless the governance system (the shareholder or stakeholder system). Before the financial crisis, we observed many differences in the implementation of different governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, after the financial crisis, we found that European banks with a civil law system have changed their governance mechanisms, increasing significantly their governance effectiveness so that nowadays both systems are more similar (convergence of governance systems). Hence, the financial crisis has meant a reduction in the gap of effectiveness between the common and civil law systems due to the implementation of different good CG practices in more Continental European banks.
Therefore, we can conclude that the global financial crisis of -2007-08 effected a larger convergence between the two most important governance systems in the world, the Anglo-American common law system (shareholder model) and the Continental European civil law system (stakeholder model). This convergence between both systems can be explained mainly by the improvement in the CG mechanisms of Continental European banks, which in turn led to an improvement in the governance effectiveness of the whole banking system.
